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Abstract
We propose a generalization of expected utility that we call generalized EU (GEU), where a
decision maker’s beliefs are represented by plausibility measures and the decision maker’s tastes
are represented by general (i.e., not necessarily real-valued) utility functions. We show that
every agent, “rational” or not, can be modeled as a GEU maximizer. We then show that we can
customize GEU by selectively imposing just the constraints we want. In particular, we show
how each of Savage’s postulates corresponds to constraints on GEU.
1 Introduction
Many decision rules have been proposed in the literature. Perhaps the best-known approach is
based on maximizing expected utility (EU), calculated either with respect to a given (objective)
probability measure, as done originally by von Neumann and Morgenstern [1947], or with respect
to a probability measure constructed from a preference order on alternatives that satisfies certain
postulates, as done originally by Savage [1954]. All these approaches follow the same pattern: they
formalize the set of alternatives among which the decision maker (DM) must choose (typically
as acts or lotteries1). They then give a set of assumptions (often called postulates or axioms)
such that the DM’s preferences on the alternatives satisfy these assumptions iff the preferences
have an EU representation, where an EU representation of a preference relation is basically a
utility function (and a probability measure when acts are involved) such that the relation among
the alternatives based on expected utility agrees with the preference relation. Moreover, they
show that the representation is essentially unique in that, given two representations of the same
preference relation, the utility functions are positive affine transformations of one another and the
probability measures are equal. Thus, if the preferences of a DM satisfy the assumptions, then she
is behaving as if she has quantified her tastes via a real-valued utility function (and her beliefs via
a probability measure) and she is relating the alternatives according to their expected utility. The
assumptions are typically regarded as criteria for rational behavior, so these results also suggest
∗Work supported in part by NSF under grants IIS-0090145 and CTC-0208535 and by the DoD Multidisciplinary
University Research Initiative (MURI) program administered by ONR under grant N00014-01-1-0795.
1Formally, given a set S of states of the world and another set C of consequences, an act a is a function from S
to C that, intuitively, associates with each state s the consequence of performing a in s. A lottery is a probability
distribution over consequences; intuitively, the distribution quantifies how likely it is that each consequence occurs.
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that if a DM’s beliefs are actually described by a probability measure and her tastes are described
by a utility function, then she should relate the alternatives according to their expected utility (if
she wishes to appear rational).
Despite the appeal of EU maximization, it is well known that people do not follow its tenets in
general [Resnik 1987]. As a result, a host of extensions of EU have been proposed that accommodate
some of the more systematic violations (see, for example, [Gul 1991; Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989;
Giang and Shenoy 2001; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Luce 2000; Quiggin 1993; Schmeidler 1989;
Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Yaari 1987]). Again, the typical approach in the decision theory
literature has been to prove representation theorems. These representation theorems essentially
view a decision rule R as a function that maps tastes (and perhaps beliefs, depending on the rule)
to a preference relation on alternatives. The theorem then says that, given a rule R, there is a set
AR of assumptions about preference orders such that a preference relation  satisfies AR iff there
exists some tastes and beliefs for the agent such that, given these as inputs, R returns .
Given this plethora of rules, it would be useful to have a general framework in which to study
decision making. The framework should also let us understand the relationship between various
decision rules. We provide such a framework in this paper.
The basic idea of our approach is to generalize the notion of expected utility so that it applies
in as general a context as possible. To this end, we introduce expectation domains, which are
structures consisting of
• three (component) domains: a plausibility domain P , a utility domain U , and a valuation
domain V ,
• two binary operators ⊕ : V × V → V and ⊗ : P ×U → V , which are the analogues of + and
× over the reals, and
• a reflexive binary relation - on V (which generalizes ≤).
Intuitively, ⊗ combines plausibility values and utility values much the same way that × combines
probability and (real) utility, while ⊕ combines the products to form the (generalized) expected
utility, in a way analogous to adding products of probabilities and utilities in calculating standard
expected utility.
We have three domains because we do not want to require that DMs be able to add or multiply
plausibility values or utility values, since these could be qualitative (e.g., plausibility values could
be “unlikely”, “likely”, “very likely”, etc., and utility values could be “bad”, “good”, “better”,
etc.). In general, we do not assume that - is an order (or even a preorder), since we would like to
be able to represent as many preference relations and decision rules as possible.
Once we have an expectation domain, DMs can express their tastes and beliefs using components
of the expectation domain. More specifically, the DMs express their beliefs using a plausibility
measure [Friedman and Halpern 1995], whose range is the plausibility domain of the expectation
domain (plausibility measures generalize probability measures and a host of other representations of
uncertainty, such as sets of probability measures, Choquet capacities, possibility measures, ranking
functions, etc.) and they express their tastes using a utility function whose range is the utility
domain of the expectation domain. In an expectation domain, it is possible to define a generalization
of expected utility, which we call generalized EU (GEU). The GEU of an act is basically the sum
(in the sense of ⊕) of products (in the sense of ⊗) of plausibility values and utility values that
generalizes the standard definition of (probabilistic) expected utility over the reals in the obvious
way.
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We start by proving an analogue of Savage’s result with respect to the decision rule (Maximizing)
GEU.2 We show that every preference relations on acts has a GEU representation (even those that
do not satisfy any of Savage’s postulates), where a GEU representation of a preference relation
basically consists of an expectation domain E, plausibility measure Pl, and utility function u,
such that the way acts are related according to their GEU agrees with the preference relation
(Theorem 3.1). In other words, no matter what the DM’s preference relation on acts is, she
behaves as if she has quantified her beliefs by a plausibility measure and her tastes via a utility
function, and is relating the acts according to their (generalized) expected utility as defined by the
⊕ and ⊗ of some expectation domain. That is, we can model any DM using GEU, whether or not
the DM satisfies any rationality assumptions. An important difference between our result and that
of Savage is that he was constructing EU representations, which consists of a real-valued utility
function u and a probability measure Pr (and the expectation domain is fixed, so ⊕, ⊗, and - are
just +, ×, and ≤, respectively).
Given that GEU can represent all preference relations, it might be argued that GEU is too
general—it offers no guidelines as to how to make decisions. We view this as a feature, not a bug,
since our goal is to provide a general framework in which to express and study decision rules, instead
of proposing yet another decision rule. Thus the absence of “guidelines” is in fact an absence of
limitations: we do not want to exclude any possibilities at the outset, even preference relations
that are not transitive or are incomplete. From the point of view of a behavioral scientist, this
has the advantage of allowing us to represent the preference relations that actually arise in real
life, which typically do not satisfy many of the standard assumptions made by decision theorists,
and doing so in a potentially compact way (by specifying ⊕, ⊗, -, a plausibility measure Pl,
and a utility function u). Perhaps more interesting is that, starting from a framework in which we
can represent all preference relations, we can then consider what preference relations have “special”
representations, in the sense that the expectation domain, plausibility measure, and utility function
in the representation satisfy some (joint) properties. This allows us to show how properties of
expectation domains correspond to properties of preference relations. We can then “customize”
GEU by placing just the constraints we want. We illustrate this by showing how each of Savage’s
postulates corresponds in a precise sense to an axiom on GEU.
This ability to customize GEU may be of more interest to computer scientists than to behavioral
scientists. If we try to design software agents that make decisions on our behalf, it may not be
appropriate to assume that they will represent beliefs using probability measures and tastes using
real-valued utilities. For example, the information that a system can obtain may be better modeled
by a set of probability measures than a single probability measure, and a user may represent his
or her tastes more qualitatively, using words like “terrific” and “terrible”, rather than numerically.
Using GEU, it should be possible to design agents that make decisions based on more general
representations of beliefs and tastes, and customize them so that the the decision-making process
satisfies certain “rationality” postulates.
There is yet another advantage of this approach, which is the focus of [Chu and Halpern 2003].
Intuitively, a decision rule maps tastes (and beliefs) to preference relations on acts. Given two
decision rulesR1 andR2, anR1 representation of R2 is basically a function τ that maps inputs ofR2
to inputs ofR1 that represent the same tastes and beliefs, with the property thatR1(τ(x)) = R2(x).
Thus, τ models, in a precise sense, a user of R2 as a user of R1, since τ preserves tastes (and beliefs).
2Many decision rules involve optimizing (i.e., maximizing or minimizing) some value function on the acts. Some-
times it is explicitly mentioned whether the function is to be maximized or minimized (e.g., “Minimax Regret” says
explicitly to “minimize the maximum regret”) while other times only the function name is mentioned and it is im-
plicitly understood what is meant (e.g., “EU” means “maximize EU”). In this paper we use “Maximizing GEU” and
“GEU” interchangeably.
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In [Chu and Halpern 2003] we show that many decision rules have GEU representations. Moreover,
we show that (almost) every decision rule has an ordinal GEU representation, where, rather than
x and τ(x) representing exactly the same tastes (and beliefs), they preserve the relation between
tastes (and beliefs), without necessarily preserving the magnitude. For example, if outcome o1 is
preferred to outcome o2 in x, o1 is also preferred to o2 in τ(x), although the magnitude of preference
may be different.
Our claim that only “many” decision rules have a GEU representation may seem inconsistent
with our earlier claim that every preference relation has a GEU representation. Representing a
preference relation is not the same as representing a decision rule. If we again view a decision rule
as a function from tastes (and possibly beliefs) to preference relation on alternatives, then decision
rule R represents a preference relation  if there are some tastes and beliefs such that, with these
as input, R returns . On the other hand, R1 represents R2 if, roughly speaking, for all possible
inputs of tastes (and beliefs), R1 and R2 return the same preference relation. That is, R1 and R2
act essentially the same way as functions.
Although there has been a great deal of work on decision rules, there has been relatively lit-
tle work on finding general frameworks for representing decision rules. In particular, there has
been no attempt to find a decision rule that can represent all preference relations. There has
been work in the fuzzy logic community on finding general notions of integration (which essentially
amounts to finding notions of expectation) using generalized notions of ⊕ and ⊗; see, for exam-
ple, [Benvenuti and Mesiar 2000]. However, the expectation domain used in this work is (a subset
of) the reals; arbitrary expectation domains are not considered. Luce [1990, 2000] also considers
general addition-like operations applied to utilities, but his goal is to model joint receipts. Receipts
are typically modeled in an arguably inefficient way, as commodity bundles; it seems more natural
to deal with them as Luce does, in terms of an abstract binary operation, akin to the operations
we have here.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We cover some basic definitions in Section 2:
plausibility domains, utility domains, expectation domains, decision problems, and GEU. We show
that every preference relation on acts has a GEU representation in Section 3. In Section 4, we show
that each of Savage’s postulates corresponds to an axiom on GEU. We conclude in Section 5. Most
proofs are deferred to the appendix.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Plausibility, Utility, and Expectation Domains
Since one of the goals of this paper is to provide a general framework for all of decision theory,
we want to represent the tastes and beliefs of the DMs in as general a framework as possible. In
particular, we do not want to force the DMs to linearly preorder all consequences and all events
(i.e., subsets of the set of states). To this end, we use plausibility measures to represent the beliefs
of the DMs and (generalized) utility functions to represent their tastes.
A plausibility domain is a set P , partially ordered by P (so P is a reflexive, antisymmetric,
and transitive relation), with two special elements ⊥P and ⊤P , such that (We often omit the
subscript P in ⊥P and ⊤P when it is clear from context.) ⊥P P x P ⊤P for all x ∈ P . Given a
set S, a function Pl : 2S → P is a plausibility measure iff
Pl1. Pl(∅) = ⊥,
Pl2. Pl(S) = ⊤, and
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Pl3. if X ⊆ Y then Pl(X)  Pl(Y ).
Clearly plausibility measures are generalizations of probability measures. As pointed out
in [Friedman and Halpern 1995], plausibility measures generalize a host of other representations
of uncertainty as well. Note that while the probability of any two sets must be comparable (since
R is totally ordered), the plausibility of two sets may be incomparable.
We also want to represent the tastes of DMs using something more general than R, so we allow
the range of utility functions to be utility domains, where a utility domain is a set U endowed with
a reflexive binary relation -U . Intuitively, elements of U represent the strength of likes and dislikes
of the DM while elements of P represent the strength of her beliefs. Note that we do not require the
DM’s preference to be transitive (although we can certainly add this requirement). Experimental
evidence shows that DM’s preferences occasionally do seem to violate transitivity.
Once we have plausibility and utility, we want to combine them to form expected utility. To
do this, we introduce expectation domains, which have utility domains, plausibility domains, and
operators ⊕ (the analogue of +) and ⊗ (the analogue of ×).3 More formally, an expectation domain
is a tuple E = (U,P, V,⊕,⊗), where (U,-U ) is a utility domain, (P,P ) is a plausibility domain,
(V,-V ) is a valuation domain (where -V is a reflexive binary relation), ⊗ : P × U → V , and
⊕ : V × V → V . There are four requirements on expectation domains:
E1. (x⊕ y)⊕ z = x⊕ (y ⊕ z);
E2. x⊕ y = y ⊕ x;
E3. ⊤⊗ x = x;
E4. (U,-U ) is a substructure of (V,-V ).
E1 and E2 say that ⊕ is associative and commutative. E3 says that ⊤ is the left-identity of ⊗ and
E4 ensures that the expectation domain respects the relation on utility values.
Note that we do not require that ⊕ be monotonic; that is, we do not require that for all
x, y, z ∈ V ,
if x -V y then x⊕ z -V y ⊕ z. (2.1)
We say that E is monotonic iff (2.1) holds. It turns out that monotonicity does not really make a
difference by itself; see Corollary 3.2.
Recall that in the standard case, ⊥ = 0 and 0× x is the identity for +. In general, we do not
assume that ⊥ ⊗ u is the identity ⊕ (or that ⊕ even has an identity). We say that E has a ⊕
identity iff
(⊥⊗ u)⊕ x = x for all u ∈ U and x ∈ V . (2.2)
Because ⊕ is commutative, there can clearly be at most one identity for ⊕, so if (2.2) holds, then
⊥⊗u1 = ⊥⊗u2 for all u1, u2 ∈ U . Requiring (2.2) has very little effect on our results. Some of the
proofs become easier, while others become somewhat more difficult, but the theorems still hold.
Note that we also do not require ⊗ to distribute over ⊕. The obvious way to state such a
requirement is to require that p ⊗ (x ⊕ y) = (p ⊗ x) ⊕ (p ⊗ y). But this is not well-defined. The
domain of ⊗ is P × U and the domain of ⊕ is V × V . If x, y ∈ U , then x⊕ y, p⊗ x, and p⊗ y are
all well defined, but x⊕ y may be an element of V −U , so p⊗ (x⊕ y) may not be well defined. As
we shall see, in cases where it the distributive property makes sense (for example, if V = U or if
u1 ⊕ u2 ∈ U for all u1, u2 ∈ U), then it actually does hold in many examples of interest.
3Sometimes we use × to denote Cartesian product; the context will always make it clear whether this is the case.
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Example 2.1 The standard expectation domain, which we denote E, is (R, [0, 1],R,+,×), where
the ordering on each domain is the standard order on the reals. This, of course, is the expectation
domain which is used in defining most decision rules in the literature. It is clearly monotonic and
has a + identity, namely 0.
Example 2.2 Consider the expectation domain E2 = (R, [0, 1] × [0, 1],R × R,⊕,⊗), where
• we use the standard order on the utility domain R;
• the order  on the plausibility domain [0, 1] × [0, 1] is such that (p1, p2)  (q1, q2) iff p1 ≤ q1
and p2 ≤ q2;
• similarly, (u1, u2) -V (v1, v2) iff u1 ≤ v1 and u2 ≤ v2;
• ⊕ is defined pointwise: (u1, u2)⊕ (v1, v2) = (u1 + v1, u2 + v2);
• ⊗ is pointwise multiplication: (p1, p2)⊗ u = (p1u, p2u).
We can view the utility domain R as a substructure of the valuation domain R× R by identifying
the element u ∈ R with the pair (u, u). Note that the ordering on the plausibility domain and
the ordering on the utility domain are both partial. E2 is also monotonic, and has (0, 0) as the ⊕
identity. The distributive property (which makes sense here) is also easily seen to hold: (p1, p2)⊗
(u1 ⊕ u2) = ((p1, p2)⊗ u1)⊕ ((p1, p2)⊗ u2).
It turns out to also be of interest to consider the expectation domain E′2 which is defined just
like E2 except that the order -
′
V on the valuation domain is defined by taking (u1, u2) -
′
V (v1, v2)
iff min(u1, u2) ≤ min(v1, v2). Note that this makes -
′
V a total order.
2.2 Decision Situations and Decision Problems
A decision situation (under uncertainty) describes the objective part of the circumstance that the
DM faces (i.e., the part that is independent of the tastes and beliefs of the DM). We model a
decision situation in a standard way, as a tuple A = (A,S,C), where
• S is the set of states of the world,
• C is the set of consequences, and
• A is a set of acts (i.e., a set of functions from S to C).
An act a is simple iff its range is finite. That is, a is simple if it has only finitely many consequences.
Many works in the literature focus on simple acts (e.g., [Fishburn 1987]). We assume in this paper
that A contains only simple acts; this means that we can define (generalized) expectation using
finite sums, so we do not have to introduce infinite series or integration for arbitrary expectation
domains. Note that all acts are guaranteed to be simple if either S or C is finite, although we do
not assume that here.
A decision problem is essentially a decision situation together with information about the tastes
and beliefs of the DM; that is, a decision problem is a decision situation together with the subjective
part of the circumstance that faces the DM. Formally, a (plausibilistic) decision problem is a tuple
D = (A, E,u,Pl), where
• A = (A,S,C) is a decision situation,
• E = (U,P, V,⊕,⊗) is an expectation domain,
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• u : C → U is a utility function, and
• Pl : 2S → P is a plausibility measure.
We say that D is monotonic iff E is monotonic.
2.3 (Generalized) Expected Utility
Let D = ((A,S,C), E,u,Pl) be a plausibilistic decision problem. Each a ∈ A induces a utility
random variable ua : S → U as follows: ua(s) = u(a(s)). In the standard setting (where utilities
are real-valued and Pl is a probability measure Pr), we can identify the expected utility of act a
with the expected value of ua with respect to Pr, computed in the standard way (where we use
ran(f) to denote the range of a function f):
EPr(ua) =
∑
x∈ran(ua)
Pr(u−1a (x))× x.
4 (2.3)
We can generalize (2.3) to an arbitrary expectation domain E = (U,P, V,⊕,⊗) by replacing +, ×,
and Pr by ⊕, ⊗, and Pl, respectively. This gives us
EPl,E(ua) =
⊕
x∈ran(ua)
Pl(u−1a (x))⊗ x. (2.4)
We call (2.4) the generalized EU (GEU) of act a. Clearly (2.3) is a special case of (2.4).
In the probabilistic case, if all singleton sets are measurable with respect to Pr (i.e., in the
domain of Pr), then
EPr(ua) =
∑
s∈S
Pr(s)× ua(s). (2.5)
The plausibilistic analogue of (2.5) is not necessarily equivalent to (2.4). A decision problem
((A,S,C), E,u,Pl) is additive iff, for all c ∈ C and nonempty X,Y ⊆ S such that X ∩ Y = ∅,
Pl(X ∪ Y )⊗ u(c) = (Pl(X) ⊗ u(c)) ⊕ (Pl(Y )⊗ u(c)).
Note that the notion of additivity we defined is a joint property of several components of a decision
problem (i.e., ⊕, ⊗, u, and Pl) instead of being a property of Pl alone. Additivity is exactly the
requirement needed to make the analogue of (2.5) equivalent to (2.4). While decision problems
involving probability are additive, those involving representations of uncertainty such as Dempster-
Shafer belief functions or, more generally, Choquet capacities, are not, in general.
Example 2.3 For a decision problem (A,E,u,Pr), where E is the standard expectation domain
and u is a real-valued utility function, GEU agrees with EU.
Example 2.4 Consider the decision problem(A, E2,u, (Pr1,Pr2)), where E2 is the expectation
domain described in Example 2.2 and u is a real-valued utility function. The pair (Pr1,Pr2) of
probability measures can be viewed as a single plausibility measure. If A = (A,S,C), then the
plausibility of X ⊆ S is a pair (Pr1(X),Pr2(X)). It is easy to check that
E(Pr1,Pr2),E2(ua) = (EPr1(ua),EPr2(ua).
4If the domain of Pr is some nontrivial subalgebra of 2S , then we must assume that ua is a measurable function;
that is, u−1a (x) is a measurable set for all x ∈ ran(ua).
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Moreover, E(Pr1,Pr2),E2(ua) -V E(Pr1,Pr2),E2(ua′) iff EPri(ua) ≤ EPri(ua′) for i = 1, 2.
On the other hand, if we consider E′2, we still have E(Pr1,Pr2),E′2(ua) = (EPr1(ua),EPr2(ua), but
now E(Pr1,Pr2),E′2(ua)E(Pr1,Pr2),E′2(ua′) iff min(EPr1(ua,EPr2(ua)) ≤ min(EPr1(ua′ ,EPr2(ua′)).
We can think of the plausibility measure (Pr1,Pr2) as describing a situation where the DM is
unsure which of Pr1 and Pr2 is the “right” probability measure. In E2, act a is considered at least
as good as a′ if it is at least as good no matter which of Pr1 and Pr2 describes the actual situation.
In E′2, a is at least as good as a
′ if the worst expected outcome of a (with respect to each of Pr1
and Pr2) is at least as good as the worst expected outcome of a
′. Note how relatively different
orderings of valuation domain can produce quite different ordering on acts, using GEU.
Another example of the use of GEU can be found in the proof of Theorem 3.1. Although the
construction does not correspond to any standard decision problem in the literature, it does show
how flexible the approach is.
3 Representing Arbitrary Preference Relations
In this section, we show that every preference relation on acts has a GEU representation. GEU, like
all decision rules, is formally a function from decision problems to preference relations on acts. Thus
a GEU representation of a preference relation -A on the acts in A = (A, . . .) is a decision problem
D = (A, E,u,Pl), where E = (U,P, V,⊕,⊗), such that a1 -A a2 iff EPl,E(ua1) -V EPl,E(ua2).
Theorem 3.1 Every preference relation -A has a GEU representation.
Proof: Fix someA = (A,S,C) and -A. We want to construct a decision problem D = (A, E,u,Pl)
such that GEU(D) = -A.
The idea is to let each consequence be its own utility and each set be its own plausibility, and
define ⊗ and ⊕ such that each act is its own expected utility. For each c ∈ C, let ac denote the
constant act with the property that ac(s) = c for all s ∈ S. Let E = (U,P, V,⊕,⊗) be defined as
follows:
1. U = (C,-C), where c -C d iff c = d or ac, ad ∈ A and ac -A ad. (Note that Savage assumes
that A contains all simple acts; in particular, A contains all constant acts. We do not assume
that here.)
2. P = (2S ,⊆).
3. V = (2S×C ,-V ), where x -V y iff x = y or x, y ∈ A and x -A y. (Note that set-theoretically
a function is a set of ordered pairs, so A ⊆ 2S×C .)
4. x⊕ y = x ∪ y for x, y ∈ V .
5. X ⊗ c = X × {c} for X ∈ 2S (= P ) and c ∈ C (= U).
We can identify c ∈ C with S × {c} in V ; with this identification, (U,-U ) is a substructure of
(V,-V ) and ⊤ ⊗ c = c for all c ∈ U (= C), as required. Furthermore, ⊕ is clearly associative and
commutative, so E is indeed an expectation domain. Let D = (A, E,u,Pl), where u(c) = c and
Pl(X) = X. Note that
EPl,E(ua) =
⊕
x∈ran(ua)
Pl(u−1a (x)) ⊗ x
=
⊕
c∈ran(a)
Pl(a−1(c))⊗ c
= {(s, c) | a(s) = c}
= a.
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That is, each act is its own expected utility; by the definition of -V , it is clear that a -A b iff
EPl,E(ua) -V EPl,E(ub). Thus GEU(D) = -A, as desired.
Note that, unlike most representation theorems, there is no uniqueness condition in Theorem 3.1.
This is because, unlike most representation theorems, we do not assume that the expectation domain
is E, the standard expectation domain, and we do not assume that -A satisfies any assumptions. So
one reason for the lack of uniqueness in Theorem 3.1 is because we place no restriction whatsoever on
-A. The other reason for the lack of uniqueness is that we consider arbitrary expectation domains
instead of restricting ourselves to E. Note that, even if -A satisfies all of Savage’s postulates,
although there is a unique GEU representation of -A using the standard expectation domain E
and probability measures (this is essentially Savage’s result), there is no unique GEU representation
if we allow arbitrary expectation domains. In particular, the representation constructed in the proof
of Theorem 3.1 is certainly distinct from the one Savage [1954] constructs.
While there is no unique GEU representation, the GEU representation we construct in the proof
of Theorem 3.1 is canonical in the following sense. Fix a decision situation A = (A,S,C) and a
preference relation -A. Suppose D = (A, E,u,Pl) is the decision problem constructed in the proof
of Theorem 3.1 and let D0 = (A, E0,u0,Pl0) be an arbitrary GEU representation of -A, where
E0 = (U0, P0, V0, ⊕̂, ⊗̂). It is easy to check that
• for all X,Y ⊆ S, Pl(X) P Pl(Y ) implies Pl0(X) P0 Pl0(Y ),
• for all c, d ∈ C, u(c) -U u(d) implies u0(c) -U0 u0(d), and
• for all X1, . . . ,Xn, Y1, . . . , Ym ⊆ S, for all c1, . . . , cn, d1, . . . , dm ∈ C,
Pl(X1)⊗ u(c1)⊕ · · · ⊕ Pl(Xn)⊗ u(cn) -V Pl(Y1)⊗ u(d1)⊕ · · · ⊕ Pl(Ym)⊗ u(dm)
implies
Pl0(X1)⊗̂u0(c1)⊕̂ · · · ⊕̂Pl0(Xn)⊗ u0(cn) -V0 Pl0(Y1)⊗̂u0(d1)⊕̂ · · · ⊕̂Pl0(Ym)⊗ u0(dm).
Thus, the representation we construct is minimal, in the sense that we relate only what has to
be related to satisfy the definition of representation. Moreover, the representation constructed in
Theorem 3.1 is in fact additive, since if X ∩ Y = ∅, then (X ∪ Y ) × {c} = (X × {c}) ∪ (Y × {c}),
and has a ⊕ identity, namely ∅.
The expectation domain E constructed in the proof of Theorem 3.1 is not (necessarily) mono-
tonic, since we certainly could have two acts a and b such that a -A b, so EPl,E(ua) -V EPl,E(ub),
but there is some x ∈ V such that EPl,E(ua)⊕x 6-V EPl,E(ub)⊕x. In fact, our construction has the
property that two distinct expressions are unrelated unless they are both expected utility values.
As the following corollary shows, it is not hard to modify the proof by extending -V so as to make
E monotonic.
Corollary 3.2 Every preference relation has a monotonic additive GEU representation with a ⊕
identity.
Proof: See the appendix.
Corollary 3.2 shows that requirements like monotonicity, additivity, and having a ⊕ identity
do not restrict the kind of preference relation that GEU can represent. But this means that these
requirements do not by themselves prevent GEU from producing “strange” preference relations
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when it is applied as a decision rule. In the next section, we consider constraints on expectations
domains that do force the preference relation produced by GEU to be arguably more reasonable.
Theorem 3.1 holds in large part because of the flexibility we have. Given a decision situation
(A,S,C) and a preference relation -A on A, we are able to construct an expectation domain and
a relation -V that is customized to capture the relation -A on A. We do not need quite this much
flexibility. We can strengthen Theorem 3.1 to show that for every decision situation A = (A,S,C),
there exists an expectation domain EA such that for all preference relations -A on A, there exists
a utility function u and plausibility measure Pl such that GEU((A, E,u,Pl) = -A. That is, given
A, we can fix the expectation domain once and for all, rather than taking a different expectation
structure (more precisely, a different order -V on the valuation domain) for each preference relation
-A. Indeed, we can even fix the plausibility measure once and for all as well.
Theorem 3.3 Given a decision situation A = (A,S,C), there exists a monotonic, additive expec-
tation domain E and a plausibility measure Pl on S such that, for every preference relation -A on
A, there exists a utility function u-A on C and that -A = GEU(D), where D = (A, E,u-A ,Pl).
Proof: Again, the argument proceeds by modifying the construction in Theorem 3.1. We leave
details to the appendix.
Theorems 3.1 and 3.3 depend (in part) on two features of our setup. The first is that, following
Savage [1954], we took acts to be functions from states to consequences. This is not an entirely
trivial assumption. In practice, different acts might produce the same consequences, depending on
how the consequences are modeled. For example, suppose that Alice has a red umbrella and a blue
umbrella (both in good condition). If the set of consequences is {“getting wet”, “staying dry”},
then carrying the red umbrella will produce the same consequences as carrying the blue umbrella.
Suppose instead that we have a consequence function c : A×S → C that takes an act a and a state
s and gives the consequence of a in s. Of course, in this setting, two distinct acts a1 and a2 could
induce the same function from states to consequences; that is, we might have c(a1, s) = c(a2, s) for
all s ∈ S. It is easy to see that if a1 and a2 induce the same function from states to consequences,
then no matter what expectation domain, utility function, and plausibility measure we use, a1
and a2 will have the same expected utility. Thus, if -A does not treat a1 and a2 the same way,
then -A has no GEU representation. (An analogue of Theorem 3.1 holds in this case: as long as
two acts that induce the same function are treated the same way by -A, then -A has a GEU
representation.)
A second reason that we do not need consistency constraints on -A is that we have placed
no constraints on -V , and relatively few constraints on ⊕, ⊗, u, and Pl. If, for example, we
required -V to be transitive, then we would also have to require that -A be transitive. The lack
of constraints on ⊕, ⊗, u, and Pl is important because it gives us enough freedom to ensure that
distinct acts have different expected utility. In the next section, we investigate what happens when
we add more constraints.
4 Representing Savage’s Postulates
Theorem 3.1 shows that GEU can represent any preference relation. We are typically interested
in representing preference relations that satisfy certain constraints, or postulates. The goal of this
section is to examine the effect of such constraints on the components that make up GEU. For
definiteness, we focus on Savage’s postulates.
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A set Pe of axioms about (i.e., constraints on) plausibilistic decision problems represents a set
of postulates Pr about decision situation and preference relation pairs with respect to a collection
of decision problems Π iff for all D ∈ Π,
D = (A, E,u,Pl) satisfies Pe iff (A,GEU(D)) satisfies Pr.
Theorem 3.1 can be viewed as saying that the empty set of axioms represents the empty set of
postulates with respect to the collection of all plausibilistic decision problems. Note that if Pe
represents Pr with respect to Π0 and Π1 ⊆ Π0, then Pe represents Pr with respect to D1 as well.
Before we present Savage’s postulates, we first introduce some notation that will make the
exposition more succinct. Suppose that f : X → Y , g : X → Y , and Z ⊆ X. Let 〈f, Z, g〉
denote the function h such that h(x) = f(x) for all x ∈ Z and h(x) = g(x) for all x ∈ Z. For
example, if X = Y = R and Z = {x | x < 0}, then 〈−x,Z, x〉 is the absolute value function.
In the intended application, the functions in question will be acts (i.e., functions from the set of
states S to consequences C). So a = 〈a1,X, a2〉 is the act such that a(s) = a1(s) for all s ∈ X and
a(s) = a2(s) for all s ∈ X. For brevity, we identify the consequence c ∈ C with the constant act
ac such that ac(s) = c for all s ∈ S. So for c1, c2 ∈ C, 〈c1,X, c2〉 is the act with the property that
a(s) = c1 for all s ∈ X and a(s) = c2 for all s ∈ X. Recall that X1, . . . ,Xn is a partition of Y iff
the Xi’s are nonempty and pairwise disjoint, and
⋃
iXi = Y .
Fix some decision situation (A,S,C). Readers familiar with [Savage 1954] will recall that Savage
assumes that A consists of all possible functions from S to C, since the DM can be questioned about
any pair of functions. (Though when Savage proves the main theorem in Chapter 5 of [Savage 1954],
he restricts attention to acts that induce simple lotteries, since he essentially reduces his prob-
lem to the one already solved by von Neumann and Morgenstern [1947], and von Neumann and
Morgenstern focused on simple lotteries.) This is a rather strong assumption. It means that the
DM is required to have preferences on a rather large set of acts, many of which are not in his
power to perform (and, indeed, many of which might be impossible to realize). Savage needs this
assumption for his theorem. We do not need it for our results, although making this assumption
simplifies the statement of the relevant axioms. As we have throughout this paper, in this section,
we continue to allow A to be any nonempty subset of the set of all simple acts. The reader might
wonder why we do not simply allow A to be the set of all simple acts, since we do not require -A
to be total. The point is that having A consist of all simple acts conceptually requires that the DM
explicitly decide, for each pair of acts, whether they are related, and if so, how; if A is a subset of
the set of all acts, then the DM does not have to express a preference between acts not in A.
It turns out that the statement of a number of our results is simpler if A consists of all simple
acts. To facilitate the comparison of our results with the standard results from the literature,
where it is typically assumed that A consists of all simple acts, we use brackets (i.e., “[” and
“]”) to delimit parts of the postulates that pertain to the general case in which A is an arbitrary
nonempty subset of the set of all simple acts. So there are two versions of the postulates, one
for the general case, which we refer to as the general version, and one for the special case (i.e.,
the case in which A is the set of all simple acts), which we refer to as the special version. The
general version includes the bracketed statements while the special version does not. Typically, the
statements inside the brackets turn unconditional assertions of the special version into implications
whose antecedent says that the acts in question are in fact members of A. We recommend that the
reader ignore the material inside the brackets on a first pass. Savage’s first six postulates are given
in Figure 1. It is easy to check that all the bracketed statements are trivially true if A is the set of
all simple acts.
As is standard in the literature, we use “a1 ≺A a2” to abbreviate “a1 -A a2 and a2 6-A a2”,
and we use “a1 ∼A a2” to abbreviate “a1 -A a2 and a2 -A a1”. (Note that in general ≺A and ∼A
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P1. For all a1, a2, a3 ∈ A,
(a) a1 -A a2 or a2 -A a1, and
(b) if a1 -A a2 and a2 -A a3, then a1 -A a3.
P2. For all X ⊆ S, a1, a2, b1, b2 ∈ A,[if 〈ai,X, bj〉 ∈ A for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, then]
〈a1,X, b1〉 -A 〈a2,X, b1〉 iff 〈a1,X, b2〉 -A 〈a2,X, b2〉.
P3. For all X ⊆ S, if there exist a1, a2 ∈ A such that[there exists b0 ∈ A such that 〈ai,X, b0〉 ∈ A
for i ∈ {1, 2}, and]
for all b ∈ A,[if 〈ai,X, b〉 ∈ A for i ∈ {1, 2}, then] 〈a1,X, b〉 ≺A 〈a2,X, b〉,
then for all c1, c2 ∈ C, [if c1, c2 ∈ A, then] c1 -A c2 iff [there exists b0 ∈ A such that
〈ci,X, b0〉 ∈ A for i ∈ {1, 2}, and]
for all b ∈ A,[if 〈ci,X, b〉 ∈ A for i ∈ {1, 2}, then] 〈c1,X, b〉 -A 〈c2,X, b〉.
P4. For all X1,X2 ⊆ S, c1, d1, c2, d2 ∈ C, if[c1, d1, c2, d2 ∈ A,] d1 ≺A c1 and d2 ≺A c2, then[if
〈ci,Xj , di〉 ∈ A for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, then]
〈c1,X1, d1〉 -A 〈c1,X2, d1〉 iff 〈c2,X1, d2〉 -A 〈c2,X2, d2〉.
P5. There exist c1, c2 ∈ C such that[c1, c2 ∈ A and] c1 ≺A c2.
P6. For all a, b ∈ A, c ∈ C, if a ≺A b, then there exists a partition Z1, . . . , Zn of S, such that for
all Zi,
[if 〈c, Zi, a〉 ∈ A then] 〈c, Zi, a〉 ≺A b and
[if 〈c, Zi, b〉 ∈ A then] a ≺A 〈c, Zi, b〉.
Figure 1: Savage’s Postulates
are not necessarily transitive, since -A is not necessarily transitive.) Recall that X1, . . . ,Xn is a
partition of Y iff
⋃
iXi = Y and for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n such that i 6= j, Xi 6= ∅ and Xi ∩Xj = ∅.
We now give a brief overview of the intuition behind the postulates and how Savage uses them.
P1 is the standard necessary condition for representation by EU (and many of its generalizations),
since R is a linear order; it basically says that -A is a total preorder. Savage defines for each subset
X ⊆ S a conditional preference relation on acts as follows: a1 -
X
A a2 iff[there exists a ∈ A such
that 〈ai,X, a〉 ∈ A for i ∈ {1, 2} and]
for all a ∈ A,[if 〈ai,X, a〉 ∈ A for i ∈ {1, 2}, then] 〈a1,X, a〉 -A 〈a2,X, a〉
(As in the statements of the postulates, we use brackets to delimit parts that are needed for the
general version.) Intuitively, a1 -
X
A a2 if when X occurs the DM would find a2 at least as good
as a1. Note that -A = -
S
A, so P1 guarantees that -
S
A is a total preorder. However, -
X
A is not
necessarily a total preorder for all X, even if P1 holds—for this, we need P2.
P2 says that the way two acts are related depends only on where they differ; the part on which
they agree can be ignored. Note that it follows from P2 that either
• for all a ∈ A,[if 〈ai,X, a〉 ∈ A for i ∈ {1, 2}, then] 〈a2,X, a〉 -A 〈a1,X, a〉 or
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• for all a ∈ A, 〈a2,X, a〉 6-A 〈a1,X, a〉.
Thus, in the presence of P2, a1 -
X
A a2 iff
• for all a ∈ A,[if 〈ai,X, a〉 ∈ A for i ∈ {1, 2}, then] 〈a2,X, a〉 ≺A 〈a1,X, a〉 or
• for all a ∈ A,[if 〈ai,X, a〉 ∈ A for i ∈ {1, 2}, then] 〈a2,X, a〉 ∼A 〈a1,X, a〉.
Using -XA , Savage defines what it means for a set to be null: a set X is null iff for all a1, a2 ∈ A,
a1 -
X
A a2[iff a2 -
X
A a1]. It is easy to check that if -
X
A is a total preorder then the general version
and the special version are equivalent. Note that X is not null iff there exist a1, a2 ∈ A such that
a1 ≺
X
A a2. In other words, if X is not null, then the DM has some nontrivial preference if X occurs.
P3 basically says that if X is not null, then c1 -A c2 iff c1 -
X
A c2. That is, whenever the DM has
some nontrivial preference, the preferences over consequences remain the same as the unconditional
ones. Savage defines a relation -S on events as follows: X -S Y iff
for all c, d ∈ C, if[c, d ∈ A,] d ≺A c,[and 〈c,X, d〉, 〈c, Y, d〉 ∈ A,] then 〈c,X, d〉 -A 〈c, Y, d〉.
The intuition is that, given two consequences c and d such that d ≺A c, the DM prefers a binary
act that is more likely to yield c than d, according to her beliefs. This is very much in the spirit
of arguments of de Finetti [1931]. P4, in the presence of P1–P3 and the assumption that A is the
set of all simple acts, basically ensures that -S is a total preorder. P5 says that S is not null.
That is, the DM has some nontrivial (unconditional) preference. P1–P5 by themselves do not allow
the construction of a unique EU representation (even if we assume that A is the set of all simple
acts). However, with the assumption that A is the set of all simple acts, P1–P5 ensure that -S is
a qualitative probability. In order to obtain a unique EU representation we need P6, which says
roughly that for all pairs of acts a, b ∈ A and consequences c ∈ C, if a ≺A b then we can partition
S into events such that the DM does not care if c were to happen in any element of the partition.
Savage also has a seventh postulate, but it is relevant only for general (nonsimple) acts. Since we
consider only simple acts, we omit it here.
It may seem that we should consider stronger versions of some postulates in the general case.
For example, we might consider a version of P2 that says that if a1, a2, b1, and b2 are simple acts
(not necessarily in A) such that 〈ai,X, bj〉 ∈ A for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 2, then 〈a1,X, b1〉 -A 〈a2,X, b1〉 iff
〈a1,X, b2〉 -A 〈a2,X, b2〉. Fortunately, it is not hard to show that the stronger version is equivalent
to the version that we have stated here, where a1, a2, b1, and b2 are required to be in A, since
if 〈a,X, b〉 ∈ A, then in fact there exist some a′, b′ ∈ A such that 〈a′,X, b′〉 = 〈a,X, b〉: just take
a′ = b′ = 〈a,X, b〉. Thus it suffices in all the postulates to quantify over A instead of over all simple
acts.
Given a decision problem D = ((A,S,C), E,u,Pl) and ∅ 6= Z ⊆ S, define the GEU of act a
restricted to Z as follows:
EPl,E(ua ↾Z) =
⊕
x∈ua(Z)
Pl(u−1a (x) ∩ Z)⊗ x,
Note that EPl,E(ua ↾S) = EPl,E(ua). Suppose that D = ((A,S,C), E,u,Pl) is additive. It is then
easy to check that, for all nonempty proper subsets X of S,
EPl,E(ua) = EPl,E(ua ↾S) = EPl,E(ua ↾X)⊕EPl,E(ua ↾X),
and, more generally, given a partition X1, . . . ,Xn of Y ⊆ S, we have that
EPl,E(ua ↾Y ) = EPl,E(ua ↾X1)⊕ · · · ⊕EPl,E(ua ↾Xn).
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Also, it is easy to check that for all nonempty proper subsets X of S,
EPl,E(u〈a1,X,a2〉) = EPl,E(ua1 ↾X)⊕EPl,E(ua2 ↾X).
Note that while these statements are true for additive decision problems, they are not true in
general.
Let ED(X) = {EPl,E(ua ↾X) | a ∈ A}. (We omit the subscript D if it is clear from context.)
Intuitively, ED(X) consists of all the expected utility values of acts in A restricted to X. To simplify
the statement of one of the axioms, let
〈〈u,X, v〉〉 =


u if X = S,
v if X = ∅,
Pl(X) ⊗ u⊕ Pl(X)⊗ v otherwise,
where u, v ∈ U and X ⊆ S. Note that EPl,E(u〈c,X,d〉) = 〈〈u(c),X,u(d)〉〉. The cases X = ∅ and
X = S must be treated specially, since we do not assume that ⊥⊗ u is the identity for ⊕. As with
Savage’s postulates, we use brackets to delimit parts needed for the general version. See Figure 2
for a list of the axioms.
A1 says that the expected utility values are linearly preordered; more specifically, A1a says that
they are totally preordered and A1b says that the relation is transitive. Note that A1 does not
say that the whole valuation domain is linearly preordered: that would be a sufficient but not a
necessary condition for GEU(D) to satisfy P1. Since we want necessary and sufficient conditions
for our representation results, some axioms apply only to expected utility values rather than to
arbitrary elements of the valuation domain.
[There is a technical assumption that we need for some parts of the general version of our
result. In general, it might be the case that EPl,E(ua) ∈ E(S), but a /∈ A; this could happen if,
even though a /∈ A, there is some b ∈ A such that EPl,E(ua) = EPl,E(ub). (Note that ua is well
defined whether or not a ∈ A, so it makes sense to talk about EPl,E(ua) even if a /∈ A.) We say
that D is whole iff this does not happen; more precisely, D = ((A,S,C), E,u,Pl) is whole iff for all
simple acts a ∈ CS, EPl,E(ua) ∈ E(S) implies a ∈ A. A decision problem whose set of acts is the
set of all simple acts is whole, but that is not a necessary condition for a decision problem to be
whole. In general, a decision problem D = ((A,S,C), E,u,Pl), where E = (U,P, V,⊕,⊗) is whole
iff, for all x ∈ V , either every act with expected utility x is in A, or no act with expected utility x
is in A.]
To simplify the statement of the theorem, let Πall be the collection of all plausibilistic decision
problems and let Πadd be the collection of additive decision problems. Also, let Π0 be the collection
of decision problems whose set of acts is the set of all simple acts[along with all decision problems
that are whole]. Let
• Π1a = Π1b = Π5 = Πall , Π4 = Π0, and
• Π2 = Π3 = Π6 = Πadd ∩Π0.
Theorem 4.1 For all i1, . . . , ik ∈ {1a, 1b, . . . , 6}, {Ai1, . . . ,Aik} represents {Pi1, . . . ,Pik} with
respect to Πi1 ∩ · · · ∩Πik .
Proof: See the appendix.
Theorem 4.1 is a strong representation result. For example, if we are interested in capturing
all of Savage’s postulates but the requirement that -A is a total preorder, and instead are willing
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A1. For all x, y, z ∈ E(S),
(a) x -V y or y -V x, and
(b) if x -V y and y -V z, then x -V z.
A2. For all nonempty proper subsets X of S, x1, x2 ∈ E(X), y1, y2 ∈ E(X),[if xi ⊕ yj ∈ E(S) for
i, j ∈ {1, 2}, then]
x1 ⊕ y1 -V x2 ⊕ y1 iff x1 ⊕ y2 -V x2 ⊕ y2.
A3. For all nonempty proper subsets X of S, if there exist x1, x2 ∈ E(X) such that[there exists
y0 ∈ E(X) such that xi ⊕ y0 ∈ E(S) for i ∈ {1, 2}, and]
for all y ∈ E(X),[if xi ⊕ y ∈ E(S) for i ∈ {1, 2}, then]x1 ⊕ y ≺V x2 ⊕ y,
then for all u1, u2 ∈ ran(u), [if u1, u2 ∈ E(S), then] u1 -V u2 iff [there exists y0 ∈ E(X)
such that Pl(X) ⊗ ui ⊕ y0 ∈ E(S) for i ∈ {1, 2}, and]
for all y ∈ E(X),[if Pl(X) ⊗ ui ⊕ y ∈ E(S) for i ∈ {1, 2}, then]
Pl(X) ⊗ u1 ⊕ y -V Pl(X) ⊗ u2 ⊕ y.
A4. For all X1,X2 ⊆ S, u1, v1, u2, v2 ∈ ran(u), if[u1, v1, u2, v2 ∈ E(S),] v1 ≺V u1 and v2 ≺V u2,
then[if 〈〈ui,Xj , vi〉〉 ∈ E(S) for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, then]
〈〈u1,X1, v1〉〉 -V 〈〈u1,X2, v1〉〉 iff 〈〈u2,X1, v2〉〉 -V 〈〈u2,X2, v2〉〉.
A5. There exist u1, u2 ∈ ran(u) such that[u1, u2 ∈ E(S) and]u1 ≺V u2.
A6. For all x, y ∈ E(S), u ∈ ran(u), if x ≺V y, then for all a, b ∈ A, c ∈ C, such that EPl,E(ua) = x,
EPl,E(ub) = y, and u(c) = u, there exists a partition Z1, . . . , Zn of S, such that x can be
expressed as x1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xn and y can be expressed as y1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ yn, where xi = EPl,E(ua ↾Zi)
and yi = EPl,E(ub ↾Zi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n,
[if Pl(Zk)⊗ u⊕
⊕
i 6=k xi ∈ E(S) then]Pl(Zk)⊗ u⊕
⊕
i 6=k xi ≺V y and
[if Pl(Zk)⊗ u⊕
⊕
i 6=k yi ∈ E(S) then]x ≺V Pl(Zk)⊗ u⊕
⊕
i 6=k yi.
Figure 2: Axioms about Decision Problems
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to allow it to be a partial preorder (a situation explored by Lehmann [1996]), we simply need to
drop the axiom A1b. Although we have focused here on Savage’s postulates, it is straightforward
to represent many of the other standard postulates considered in the decision theory literature in
much the same way.
5 Conclusion
We have introduced GEU, a notion of generalized EU, and shown that GEU can (a) represent all
preference relations on acts and (b) be customized to capture any subset of Savage’s postulates.
As we pointed out in the introduction, these results may be of particular interest to designers of
software agents, who may want to deal with more general representations of tastes and beliefs
than real-valued utilities and probabilities. If beliefs are represented using a plausibility measures
and tastes are represented by a utility function that is not necessarily real-valued, the problem for
the software designer is reduced to finding appropriate ways of combining plausibility and utility
using ⊕ and ⊗, and finding an appropriate order on the resulting expressions. The results of this
paper suggest that rationality postulates can be captured by choosing ⊕ and ⊗ so that they satisfy
certain constraints. The results of [Chu and Halpern 2003] show that we lose no generality by using
GEU to represent the decision making process; essentially all decision rules rules can be (ordinally)
represented by GEU. Thus, the framework of expectation domains together with GEU provides a
useful level of abstraction in which to study the general problem of decision making and rules for
decision making and a useful conceptual framework for designing decision rules for software agents.
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A Proofs
Corollary 3.2 Every preference relation has a monotonic additive GEU representation with a ⊕
identity.
Proof: Fix some A = (A,S,C) and -A. Let D be as defined in the proof of Theorem 3.1, except
that x -V y iff x = y or there exist a, b ∈ A such that a -A b and
1. x = EPl,E(ua) and y = EPl,E(ub), or
2. x = EPl,E(ua)⊕ z and y = EPl,E(ub)⊕ z for some z ∈ V .
Recall that EPl,E(ua) = a, so without case 2, we are back in the situation described in the proof
of Theorem 3.1. Note that, by construction, the only way that EPl,E(ua) ⊕ z can be an expected
utility value is if z ⊆ EPl,E(ua), since ⊕ = ∪ and proper supersets of expected utility values cannot
be expected utility values. Thus, if in case 2 both x and y are expected utility values, then we must
in fact be in case 1; case 2 has an effect only when x and y are not both expected utility values.
Thus, case 2 does not affect how pairs of expected utility values are related, so we still have that
GEU(D) = -A.
To see that ⊕ is monotonic with respect to this definition of -V , suppose that x -V y. We
need to show that x⊕ z -V y ⊕ z. If x = y, then x⊕ z = y ⊕ z, so the conclusion holds. Suppose
that x 6= y. Then there exist some a, b ∈ A such that a -A b and either case 1 or case 2 holds. It
is easy to see that in either case, x⊕ z -V y ⊕ z by case 2. Thus D is a monotonic representation
of -A (and, as we have already observed, D is additive).
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Theorem 3.3 Given a decision situation A = (A,S,C), there exists a monotonic, additive expec-
tation domain E and a plausibility measure Pl on S such that, for every preference relation -A on
A, there exists a utility function u-A on C and that -A = GEU(D), where D = (A, E,u-A ,Pl).
Proof: Let P(A) consist of all preference relations on A. We now modify the construction in
Theorem 3.1 as follows:
1. U = (C × 2P(A),-U ), where (c,X) -U (d, Y ) iff X = {-A} = Y for some -A ∈ P(A) and
either c = d or ac, ad ∈ A and ac -A ad.
2. P = (2S ,⊆).
3. V = (2S×C × 2P(A),-V ), where (x,X) -V (y, Y ) iff X = {-A} = Y for some -A ∈ P(A)
and either x = y or x, y ∈ A and x -A y.
4. (x,X) ⊕ (y, Y ) = (x ∪ y,X ∪ Y ).
5. X ⊗ (c, Y ) = (X × {c}, Y ) for X ⊆ S, c ∈ C, and Y ⊆ P(A).
The same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3.1, this construction gives an additive expectation
domain. We can modify -V as in Corollary 3.2 to make it monotonic. With a little more effort,
we can further modify it so that there is a ⊕ identity; we omit details here.
Let Pl(X) = X. Given a preference relation -A, define the utility function u-A by taking
u-A(c) = (c, {-A}). Again, the same arguments as those in Theorem 3.1 can be used to show that
-A = GEU(D), where D = (A, E,u-A ,Pl).
Theorem 4.1 For all i1, . . . , ik ∈ {1a, 1b, . . . , 6}, {Ai1, . . . ,Aik} represents {Pi1, . . . ,Pik} with
respect to Πi1 ∩ · · · ∩Πik .
Proof: We first establish the result for singleton sets. Let D = (A, E,u,Pl), where A = (A,S,C),
be an arbitrary decision problem. [As in the statements of the postulates and axioms, we will use
brackets to delimit the parts of the proof that pertain to the conditional versions.]
• A1a represents P1a and with respect to Π1a and A1b represents P1b with respect to Π1b.
We do the case of A1a represents P1a with respect to Π1a and leave the other case, which is
completely analogous to the one we do, to the reader.
Suppose that D satisfies A1a. We need to show that (A,GEU(D)) satisfies P1a. Let
a1, a2, a3 ∈ A. Let xi = EPl,E(uai); clearly x1, x2, x3 ∈ E(S). Since D satisfies A1a, x1 -V x2
or x2 -V x1. In other words, a1 -GEU(D) a2 or a2 -GEU(D) a1. Thus (A,GEU(D)) satisfies
P1a. Now suppose that (A,GEU(D)) satisfies P1a. We need to show that D satisfies A1a.
Let x1, x2, x3 ∈ E(S). Then there exist a1, a2, a3 ∈ A such that EPl,E(uai) = xi. Since
(A,GEU(D)) satisfies P1a, a1 -GEU(D) a2 or a2 -GEU(D) a1. Thus x1 -V x2 or x2 -V x1.
So D satisfies A1a.
• A2 represents P2 with respect to Π2.
Throughout this part of the proof, we assume that D ∈ Π2; in particular, we assume that D
is additive and we will use this fact without further comment.
Suppose that D satisfies A2. We need to show that (A,GEU(D)) satisfies P2. Suppose that
X ⊆ S and a1, a2, b1, b2 ∈ A. [Suppose further that 〈ai,X, bj〉 ∈ A.]We need to show that
〈a1,X, b1〉 -GEU(D) 〈a2,X, b1〉 iff 〈a1,X, b2〉 -GEU(D) 〈a2,X, b2〉.
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If X = ∅ or X = S, then the above is trivially true. So assume that X is a nonempty proper
subset of S. Let xi = EPl,E(uai ↾X) and yj = EPl,E(ubj ↾X). Clearly xi ∈ E(X), yj ∈ E(X),
and EPl,E(u〈ai,X,bj〉) = xi ⊕ yj. [Furthermore, xi ⊕ yj ∈ E(S), since 〈ai,X, bj〉 ∈ A.]Since D
satisfies A2, we have that
x1 ⊕ y1 -V x2 ⊕ y1 iff x1 ⊕ y2 -V x2 ⊕ y2,
so
〈a1,X, b1〉 -GEU(D) 〈a2,X, b1〉 iff 〈a1,X, b2〉 -GEU(D) 〈a2,X, b2〉.
Thus (A,GEU(D)) satisfies P2.
Suppose that (A,GEU(D)) satisfies P2. We need to show that D satisfies A2. [We assume
for this direction that D is whole.] Suppose that X is a nonempty proper subset of S,
x1, x2 ∈ E(X), and y1, y2 ∈ E(X). [Suppose further that xi ⊕ yj ∈ E(S).]We need to show
that
x1 ⊕ y1 -V x2 ⊕ y1 iff x1 ⊕ y2 -V x2 ⊕ y2.
Note that there exist a1, a2, b1, b2 ∈ A such that EPl,E(uai ↾X) = xi and EPl,E(ubi ↾X) = yi.
Observe that EPl,E(u〈ai,X,bj〉) = xi⊕ yj. [Since xi⊕ yj ∈ E(S) and D is whole, it follows that
〈ai,X, bj〉 ∈ A.] Since (A,GEU(D)) satisfies P2,
〈a1,X, b1〉 -GEU(D) 〈a2,X, b1〉 iff 〈a1,X, b2〉 -GEU(D) 〈a2,X, b2〉,
so
x1 ⊕ y1 -V x2 ⊕ y1 iff x1 ⊕ y2 -V x2 ⊕ y2.
Thus D satisfies A2.
• A3 represents P3 with respect to Π3.
Throughout this part of the proof, we assume that D ∈ Π3; in particular, we assume that D
is additive and we will use this fact without further comment.
For this part, we will prove a slightly stronger claim that actually has a shorter proof. Note
that A3 and P3 are both implications. We show that D satisfies the antecedent (consequent)
of A3 iff (A,GEU(D)) satisfies the antecedent (consequent) of P3. [We assume that D is
whole in these arguments.]This implies that D satisfies A3 iff (A,GEU(D)) satisfies P3.
Note that P3 quantifies over all subsets of S while A3 quantifies over only nonempty proper
subsets of S. It is easy to check that ∅ and S satisfy P3. (More precisely, (A,GEU(D))
satisfies the instance of P3 in which X is instantiated with ∅ and the instance of P3 in which
X is instantiated with S.) So for the rest of this part, we restrict our attention to nonempty
proper subsets of S.
We begin by showing that D satisfies the antecedent of A3 iff (A,GEU(D)) satisfies the
antecedent of P3. Fix some X that is a nonempty proper subset of S. We need to show that
there exist x1, x2 ∈ E(X) such that
1. [there exists y0 ∈ E(X) such that xi⊕y0 ∈ E(S) and] for all y ∈ E(X),[if xi⊕y ∈ E(S),
then]x1 ⊕ y ≺V x2 ⊕ y
iff there exist a1, a2 ∈ A such that
2. [there exists b0 ∈ A such that 〈ai,X, b0〉 ∈ A and] for all b ∈ A,[if 〈ai,X, b〉 ∈ A, then]
〈a1,X, b〉 ≺A 〈a2,X, b〉.
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To see that 1 implies 2, suppose that x1, x2 ∈ E(X) satisfy 1. Since x1, x2 ∈ E(X), there exist
a1, a2 ∈ A such that EPl,E(uai ↾X) = xi. We show that a1 and a2 satisfy 2. [To see that
the first conjunct is true, note that by 1 there exists y0 ∈ E(X) such that xi ⊕ y0 ∈ E(S);
fix some such y0. Note that there exists b0 ∈ A such that EPl,E(ub0 ↾X) = y0; observe that
EPl,E(u〈ai,X,b0〉) = xi⊕ y0 ∈ E(S). Since D is whole, 〈ai,X, b0〉 ∈ A. For the second conjunct,
we proceed as follows.] Let b ∈ A [be such that 〈ai,X, b〉 ∈ A]. We need to show that
〈a1,X, b〉 ≺A 〈a2,X, b〉. Let y = EPl,E(ub ↾X). Note that y ∈ E(X) and EPl,E(u〈ai,X,b〉) =
xi ⊕ y. [Furthermore, since 〈ai,X, b〉 ∈ A, xi ⊕ y ∈ E(S).] By 1, x1 ⊕ y ≺V x2 ⊕ y; thus
〈a1,X, b〉 ≺A 〈a2,X, b〉.
To see that 2 implies 1, suppose that a1, a2 ∈ A satisfy 2. Let xi = EPl,E(uai ↾X); note that
xi ∈ E(X). We show that x1 and x2 satisfy 1. [To see that the first conjunct is true, note that
by 2 there exists b0 ∈ A such that 〈ai,X, b0〉 ∈ A; fix some such b0. Let y0 = EPl,E(ub0 ↾X).
Note that xi⊕y0 = EPl,E(u〈ai,X,b〉), so y0 ∈ E(X) and xi⊕y0 ∈ E(S). For the second conjunct,
we proceed as follows.] Let y ∈ E(X)[be such that xi ⊕ y ∈ E(S)]. We need to show that
x1 ⊕ y ≺V x2 ⊕ y. Note that there exists b ∈ A such that EPl,E(ub ↾X) = y; observe that
EPl,E(u〈ai,X,b〉) = xi ⊕ y. [Furthermore, since xi ⊕ y ∈ E(S) and D is whole, 〈ai,X, b〉 ∈ A.]
By 2, 〈a1,X, b〉 ≺A 〈a2,X, b〉; thus x1 ⊕ y ≺V x2 ⊕ y.
We now show that D satisfies the consequent of A3 iff (A,GEU(D)) satisfies the consequent
of P3. We need to show that
3. for all u1, u2 ∈ ran(u),[if u1, u2 ∈ E(S), then]u1 -V u2 iff[there exists y ∈ E(X) such
that Pl(X) ⊗ ui ⊕ y ∈ E(S) and] for all y ∈ E(X), [if Pl(X) ⊗ ui ⊕ y ∈ E(S), then]
Pl(X) ⊗ u1 ⊕ y -V Pl(X) ⊗ u2 ⊕ y
iff
4. for all c1, c2 ∈ C, [if c1, c2 ∈ A, then] c1 -GEU(D) c2 iff [there exists b ∈ A such that
〈ci,X, b〉 ∈ A and] for all b ∈ A,[if 〈ci,X, b〉 ∈ A, then] 〈c1,X, b〉 -GEU(D) 〈c2,X, b〉.
Suppose that 3 holds. We need to show that 4 holds. Fix some c1, c2 ∈ C [such that
c1, c2 ∈ A]. Let ui = u(ci). Then ui ∈ ran(u)[and u1, u2 ∈ E(S)]. Note that c1 -GEU(D) c2
iff u1 -V u2. By 3, u1 -V u2 iff[there exists y ∈ E(X) such that Pl(X)⊗ui⊕ y ∈ E(S) and]
for all y ∈ E(X),[if Pl(X)⊗ui⊕y ∈ E(S), then]Pl(X)⊗u1⊕y -V Pl(X)⊗u2⊕y. [It is easy
to check that there exists y ∈ E(X) such that Pl(X)⊗ui⊕y ∈ E(S) iff there exists b ∈ A such
that 〈ci,X, b〉 ∈ A; the “only if” part depends on the assumption that D is whole.]To see that
4 holds, fix some b ∈ A[such that 〈ci,X, b〉 ∈ A]. We need to show that 〈c1,X, b〉 -GEU(D)
〈c2,X, b〉. Let y = EPl,E(ub ↾X); then y ∈ E(X) and Pl(X)⊗ui⊕y = EPl,E(u〈ci,X,b〉). [Since
〈ci,X, b〉 ∈ A, Pl(X) ⊗ ui ⊕ y ∈ E(S)]. By 3, Pl(X) ⊗ u1 ⊕ y -V Pl(X) ⊗ u2 ⊕ y; thus
〈c1,X, b〉 -GEU(D) 〈c2,X, b〉.
Now suppose that 4 holds. We need to show that 3 holds. Fix some u1, u2 ∈ ran(u) [such
that u1, u2 ∈ E(S)]. Then there exist some c1, c2 ∈ C such that u(ci) = ui [and c1, c2 ∈ A].
Note that u1 -V u2 iff c1 -GEU(D) c2. By 4, c1 -GEU(D) c2 iff[there exists b ∈ A such that
〈ci,X, b〉 ∈ A and] for all b ∈ A, [if 〈ci,X, b〉 ∈ A, then] 〈c1,X, b〉 -GEU(D) 〈c2,X, b〉. [As
before, it is easy to check that there exists b ∈ A such that 〈ci,X, b〉 ∈ A iff there exists
y ∈ E(X) such that Pl(X)⊗ui⊕y ∈ E(S); now the “if” part depends on the assumption that
D is whole.]To see that 3 holds, fix some y ∈ E(X)[such that Pl(X)⊗ ui ⊕ y ∈ E(S)]. We
need to show that Pl(X)⊗u1⊕ y -V Pl(X)⊗u2⊕ y. Note that there exists some b ∈ A such
that EPl,E(ub ↾X) = y; observe that EPl,E(u〈ci,X,b〉) = Pl(X) ⊗ ui ⊕ y [and 〈ci,X, b〉 ∈ A,
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since Pl(X) ⊗ ui ⊕ y ∈ E(S) and D is whole]. By 4, 〈c1,X, b〉 -GEU(D) 〈c2,X, b〉; thus
Pl(X) ⊗ u1 ⊕ y -V Pl(X) ⊗ u2 ⊕ y.
• A4 represents P4 with respect to Π4.
Suppose that D satisfies A4. We need to show that (A,GEU(D)) satisfies P4. Suppose that
X1,X2 ⊆ S, c1, d1, c2, d2 ∈ C, [c1, d1, c2, d2 ∈ A, 〈ci,Xj , di〉 ∈ A,] d1 ≺A c1, and d2 ≺A c2.
We need to show that
〈c1,X1, d1〉 -GEU(D) 〈c1,X2, d1〉 iff 〈c2,X1, d2〉 -GEU(D) 〈c2,X2, d2〉.
Let ui = u(ci) and vi = u(di). Note that u1, v1, u2, v2 ∈ ran(u) [and u1, u2, v1, v2 ∈ E(S)].
Also, vi ≺V ui, since di ≺GEU(D) ci. Note that EPl,E(u〈ci,Xj ,di〉) = 〈〈ui,Xj , vi〉〉. [Since
〈ci,Xj , di〉 ∈ A, 〈〈ui,Xj , vi〉〉 ∈ E(S).] Since D satisfies A4,
〈〈u1,X1, v1〉〉 -V 〈〈u1,X2, v1〉〉 iff 〈〈u2,X1, v2〉〉 -V 〈〈u2,X2, v2〉〉,
which means that
〈c1,X1, d1〉 -GEU(D) 〈c1,X2, d1〉 iff 〈c2,X1, d2〉 -GEU(D) 〈c2,X2, d2〉.
Thus, (A,GEU(D)) satisfies P4.
Now suppose that (A,GEU(D)) satisfies P4. We need to show that D satisfies A4. [For
this direction, we assume that D is whole.] Suppose that X1,X2 ⊆ S, u1, v1, u2, v2 ∈ ran(u),
[u1, v1, u2, v2 ∈ E(S), 〈〈ui,Xj , vi〉〉 ∈ E(S),] v1 ≺V u1, and v2 ≺V u2. We need to show that
〈〈u1,X1, v1〉〉 -V 〈〈u1,X2, v1〉〉 iff 〈〈u2,X1, v2〉〉 -V 〈〈u2,X2, v2〉〉.
Let c1, d1, c2, d2 ∈ C be such that [c1, d1, c2, d2 ∈ A,] u(ci) = ui and u(di) = vi. Then we
see that di ≺GEU(D) ci, since vi ≺V ui. Note that 〈〈ui,Xj , vi〉〉 = EPl,E(u〈ci,Xj ,di〉). [Since
〈〈ui,Xj , vi〉〉 ∈ E(S) and D is whole, 〈ci,Xj , di〉 ∈ A.] Since (A,GEU(D)) satisfies P4,
〈c1,X1, d1〉 -GEU(D) 〈c1,X2, d1〉 iff 〈c2,X1, d2〉 -GEU(D) 〈c2,X2, d2〉,
which implies that
〈〈u1,X1, v1〉〉 -V 〈〈u1,X2, v1〉〉 iff 〈〈u2,X1, v2〉〉 -V 〈〈u2,X2, v2〉〉.
So D satisfies A4.
• A5 represents P5 with respect to Π5.
D satisfies A5 iff there exist u1, u2 ∈ ran(u) such that[u1, u2 ∈ E(S) and]u1 ≺V u2 iff there
exist some c1, c2 ∈ C such that[c1, c2 ∈ A and]u(c1) ≺V u(c2) iff there exist some c1, c2 ∈ C
such that[c1, c2 ∈ A and] c1 ≺GEU(D) c2 iff (A,GEU(D)) satisfies P5.
• A6 represents P6 with respect to Π6.
Throughout this part of the proof, we assume that D ∈ Π6; in particular, we assume that D
is additive and we will use this fact without further comment.
Suppose that D satisfies A6. We need to show that (A,GEU(D)) satisfies P6. Let a, b ∈ A and
c ∈ C. Suppose that a ≺GEU(D) b. We need to show that there exists a partition Z1, . . . , Zn
of S, such that for all Zi,
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1. [if 〈c, Zi, a〉 ∈ A then] 〈c, Zi, a〉 ≺GEU(D) b and
2. [if 〈c, Zi, b〉 ∈ A then] a ≺GEU(D) 〈c, Zi, b〉.
Let x = EPl,E(ua), y = EPl,E(ub), and u = u(c). Then x, y ∈ E(S), u ∈ ran(u), x ≺V y,
EPl,E(ua) = x, EPl,E(ub) = y, and u(c) = u, so (by A6) there exists a partition Z1, . . . , Zn
of S, such that x can be expressed as x1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xn and y can be expressed as y1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ yn,
where xi = EPl,E(ua ↾Zi) and yi = EPl,E(ub ↾Zi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n,
3. [if Pl(Zk)⊗ u⊕
⊕
i 6=k xi ∈ E(S) then]Pl(Zk)⊗ u⊕
⊕
i 6=k xi ≺V y, and
4. [if Pl(Zk)⊗ u⊕
⊕
i 6=k yi ∈ E(S) then]x ≺V Pl(Zk)⊗ u⊕
⊕
i 6=k yi.
To see that 1 holds, note that Pl(Zk) ⊗ u ⊕
⊕
i 6=k xi = EPl,E(u〈c,Zi,a〉). [Suppose that
〈c, Zi, a〉 ∈ A; then EPl,E(u〈c,Zi,a〉) ∈ E(S).] By 3, Pl(Zk) ⊗ u ⊕
⊕
i 6=k xi ≺V y. Thus
〈c, Zi, a〉 ≺GEU(D) b as desired. The argument that 2 holds is completely analogous (we use 4
instead of 3 to establish that 2 holds), and we leave it to the reader.
Now suppose that (A,GEU(D)) satisfies P6. We need to show that D satisfies A6. [For this
direction we assume that D is whole.]Let x, y ∈ E(S) and u ∈ ran(u). Suppose that x ≺V y.
Let a, b ∈ A and c ∈ C be such that EPl,E(ua) = x, EPl,E(ub) = y, and u(c) = u. We need to
show that there exists a partition Z1, . . . , Zn of S, such that x can be expressed as x1⊕· · ·⊕xn
and y can be expressed as y1⊕ · · · ⊕ yn, where xi = EPl,E(ua ↾Zi) and yi = EPl,E(ub ↾Zi) for
1 ≤ i ≤ n, and for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n, 3 and 4 hold.
Since x ≺V y, a ≺GEU(D) b, so (by P6) there exists a partition Z1, . . . , Zn of S such that for
all Zi, 1 and 2 hold. To see that 4 holds, note that EPl,E(u〈c,Zi,b〉) = Pl(Zk) ⊗ u ⊕
⊕
i 6=k yi.
[Suppose that EPl,E(u〈c,Zi,b〉) ∈ E(S); then 〈c, Zi, b〉 ∈ A, since D is whole.] By 2, a ≺A
〈c, Zi, b〉. Thus x ≺V Pl(Zk) ⊗ u ⊕
⊕
i 6=k yi. The argument that 3 holds is completely
analogous (we use 1 instead of 2 to establish that 3 holds), and we leave that to the reader.
So far we have shown that Ai represents Pi with respect to Πi, for i ∈ {1a, 1b, . . . , 6}. Let
i1, . . . , ik ∈ {1a, 1b, . . . , 6}. Suppose that D ∈ Πi1 ∩ · · · ∩ Πik and that D satisfies {Ai1, . . . ,Aik}.
Since D ∈ Πij and D satisfies Aij , it follows that (A,GEU(D)) satisfies Pij. Thus (A,GEU(D))
satisfies {Pi1, . . . ,Pik}. Conversely, if D ∈ Πi1 ∩· · ·∩Πik and (A,GEU(D)) satisfies {Pi1, . . . ,Pik},
then D satisfies {Ai1, . . . ,Aik}. Thus {Ai1, . . . ,Aik} represents {Pi1, . . . ,Pik} with respect to
Πi1 ∩ · · · ∩Πik .
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